wherein lies the independent corroborative evidence for these genes. Dr. Dunn dismisses the whole matter in a single brief paragraph which really amounts to an argument in a circle.

This is all the more surprising since Dr. Dunn gives a large section to eugenics and to improvements in stock and crops in the light of modern knowledge, in which the notion of multiple factors is taken for granted without more ado. It is, however, worth reminding ourselves that Mendelism has in fact played very little part in economic genetics, or for that matter in eugenics. Galton wrote before the rediscovery of Mendelism, and while the great improvements in milk and egg production during the last twenty-five years may be explained by the professor in terms of multiple factors, they were certainly brought about by the practical man wholly innocent of Mendelism. Dr. Dunn fails to make clear exactly in what respect the new knowledge of Mendelism has affected our notions of eugenics. These are minor points of criticism; and in fairness to the author, we should not forget that by limiting the size of the book, the publishers have added greatly to the author's difficulties.

Professor Crampton's volume gives a very readable and on the whole accurate account of the coming of evolution. In our opinion Alfred Russell Wallace deserves more than a passing reference. A good (though rather one-sided) account is given of the present position of Lamarckism; but though Mendelism and chromosomes are cited as the very latest developments of Darwinism, it is a pity that Professor Crampton does not give some account of the present position of Darwin's tenets in the light of more recent experiment and observation on natural selection.

Professor Crampton's most interesting thesis is that the dogma of the Mosaic creation became attached to the Christian religion only at a relatively late date. According to Professor Crampton, the early Christian fathers from St. Augustine down to Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) followed Aristotle in being evolutionists; it was only with the rise of the Jesuits that the literal interpretation of Genesis became part of the Christian dogma. This is, as Professor Crampton remarks, contrary to the usual opinion, and it is a pity that space did not allow him to develop this interesting aspect more fully.

The least satisfactory volume is that of Professor Bean on the races of man. It contains many facile general statements which the unwary reader would take to be established facts, but which are in reality the opinions of Professor Bean—or rather Professor Bean's choice from the great variety of opinions expressed by those in authority. Readers of the recent controversy in this REVIEW* will be interested to learn that Professor Bean would seem to favour the notion of man being all one species, without any sharp permanent well-defined subdivisions. But this is exactly one of the many points on which Professor Bean is content with a vague generality.

One of the troubles of anthropology and ethnology is that (apart perhaps from psychology) they are the least objective of the sciences—the proportion of opinion to fact is far too high; perhaps it is this that makes anthropologists and ethnologists so given to embittered controversy.

MICHAEL PEASE.

SOCIOLOGY

Westermarck, Edward, Ph.D., LL.D. *The Future of Marriage in Western Civilisation.* London, 1936. Macmillan & Co. Pp. 281. Price 12s. 6d.

No one familiar with Dr. Westermarck's classical writings on the subject of marriage could fail to be interested in his predictions as to the future of this institution; and, indeed, no one is in a better position than Dr. Westermarck to divest the subject of the prejudices with which it is customarily viewed. In this inquiry, the author deals with the contemporary problems of marriage

* EUGENICS REVIEW, 1936, XXVIII, 161, 245; also this issue, p. 333.

in the light of the psychological and sociological causes which have determined our attitude to them; and he seeks to ascertain which of these attitudes are likely to undergo change or to survive. "Many of these causes," he writes, "cannot be properly understood without a knowledge of the past. Hence I shall repeatedly have to fall back on my earlier researches in the history of marriage when pondering over its future."

What then does this authority think is to be its future? His answer to this question is summarized in the last chapter of his book wherein he explains what he takes to be the essential facts of the human moral consciousness. All moral conceptions and judgments are held to be ultimately based on one of two moral emotions—moral approval or disapproval. These emotions differ from non-moral emotions by being disinterested and, within certain limits, impartial. Such sentiments may arise in three ways. In the first place, we may experience them directly and immediately on account of an injury inflicted or a benefit conferred upon an individual with whose pain or pleasure we sympathize. In the second place, we may feel them by a process of contagion, because other people show outward signs of them. In an infuriated crowd one man gets angry because others get angry, and often the question "Why?" is hardly asked. By such a process, children acquire the same reactions as their parents and fall in with tribal customs which provide the earliest rule of duty. The word "morality," in fact, is derived from *mos* and the German "Sittlichkeit" from *Sitte*. The power of words to arouse moral condemnation is great, and such epithets as "murderer," "thief," "coward" and "traitor," as well as many terms describing types of sexual behaviour, in themselves express opprobrium. Thirdly, disinterested moral emotions of a hostile character can be generated by what Bain called "disinterested antipathies" or "sentimental aversions." These are specially provoked by anything unusual, new or foreign. Differences of taste, habit and opinion, easily give rise to such dislikes. (The last two ways by which our innate moral proclivities are said to be shaped are surely similar; they both derive from human suggestibility. Are not our disinterested antipathies mainly, if not wholly, determined by the ways our minds were moulded when young?)

But the irrationalities of the moral emotions are, in Dr. Westermarck's view, in gradual process of being corrected through the operation of intellectual factors. By these, we are guided towards a utilitarian theory of morality in accordance with which actions are judged to be right in proportion as they promote happiness, and wrong as they produce unhappiness. Such causes of traditional moral judgments as ignorance, superstition, prejudice or selfishness in those who once laid down rules of conduct lose their force in the measure that "correct utilitarian considerations," prompted by reflection and knowledge of facts, pave the way for new traditions. Thus, by certain Christian theologians, the act of masturbation was regarded as morally more reprehensible than fornication, and by the Mohammedan world as worse than bestiality or pederasty. These views are no longer accepted. The application, however, to moral problems of the pure light of reason has not always yielded results which we should expect to-day. Thus Kant found that the categorical imperative of practical reason prescribes castration as a punishment for masculine homosexuality. But despite these lapses in the human rational function, Dr. Westermarck considers that knowledge and intellectual discernment will, in the future, become more widespread, and will destroy much that is due to ignorance, superstition and thoughtlessness.

As is to be expected, he has much to criticize in the orthodox view of marriage. Too much stress, he thinks, is laid on the occasional committing of adultery. The relations of husband and wife are not always disturbed by adultery, which is rarely the real ground for divorce; and discussing trial marriages, he says that "nothing could be more conducive to harmonious relations between husband and wife than intimate premarital experience of each other, with reference to sexual compatibility, mental compatibility,

and other factors connected with the community of married life, and procreation."

Nevertheless, there are forces in the human mind which will conserve the institution of marriage. "So far as I can see," he says, "there is every reason to believe that the unity of sensual and spiritual elements in sexual love, leading to a more or less durable community of life in a common home, and the desire for and love of offspring, are factors which will remain lasting obstacles to the extinction of marriage and the collapse of the family, because they are too deeply rooted in human nature to fade away, and can find adequate satisfaction only in some form of marriage and the family founded upon it. . . . Marriage is not made for everybody, not attractive to everybody, nor good for everybody who embarks in it. . . . But without it there would presumably be still more suffering in the world, and much less happiness. It is flexible; it may be improved by increasing knowledge, forethought, and self-control, by changed social and moral attitudes towards sexual relationships, by legal reforms. And while the persistence of marriage is conducive to individual welfare, it is apparently indispensable to the social order."

Yet the comforting prospect which Dr. Westermarck unfolds of how the forces of superstition will ultimately yield to those of common sense does not entirely dispel misgivings. For within historical times, the progress of reason in these matters has repeatedly been interrupted by violent setbacks. Some may discern in the recent events in Russia and Germany such a setback. These vicissitudes are not dwelt upon by Dr. Westermarck, nor are their causes discussed. It is regrettable in this connection that no reference is made to the contribution on this subject made by the late Mr. J. D. Unwin in his remarkable book *Sex and Culture*.* In the last chapter of this work, attention is drawn to how, in the history of civilized societies, phases of laxity in sexual behaviour have alternated with phases of strictness, and an interesting hypothesis is advanced of how these successive manifestations are linked with a society's cultural potentiality.

C. P. BLACKER.

* EUGENICS REVIEW, XXVII, 56.

Kemp, Dr. Tage. *Prostitution.* London, 1936. Heinemann (and Copenhagen, Levin & Munksgaard). Pp. 253. Price 12s. 6d.

THIS extremely thorough and valuable book consisting almost entirely of statements of fact, is in striking contrast to the many theoretical books devoted to sexual subjects: indeed, so much of it consists of case-histories of individuals that it is by no means easy reading. The cases are all taken from Copenhagen, but this detracts little from the value of the book to English readers, for the author points out that the characteristics of prostitution are largely international, and, in addition, the Danish law has greatly resembled our own since 1906, when state supervision was abandoned—a change which, it is interesting to observe, has proved all to the good. As might be expected, it is difficult to generalize from the data contained and none of the popularly current views of the causes of prostitution is either established or negatived. Some facts are clearly demonstrated, but they are all much what might be expected. Thus, it was found that many of the prostitutes were mentally abnormal—some defective to a greater or less degree, some psychopathic, some both. And of these, and indeed of all the prostitutes, a large number came from families containing criminals, drunkards, defectives and other social ineffectives, in other words from what we call the "social problem group." The author considers his subject with particular reference to hereditary factors, but he has to admit that sterilization would produce comparatively little effect. Also, the hereditary factor must not be stressed too much: obviously, the daughter or younger sister of a prostitute may turn to prostitution for other than hereditary reasons, and the same applies to girls brought up by parents who are drunkards, criminals or defectives. Nor